Water information disclosure is an important factor for water-sensitive companies to send information to capital market and gain returns. Whether or how the companies disclose water information becomes a focus for government and stakeholders. This paper, based on Shanghai\|listed chemical companies data from 2016 to 2018, establishes a multiple regression model to study the impacts of enterprise features, internal management, financial status and external factors on water information disclosure. Results show that enterprise size, listed periods, capital intensity, gross capital returns, public supervision pressure are positively related to water information disclosure level, but board proportion and Tobin Q value are negatively related to it. Equity concentration, asset debt rate, equipment renewal rate and local economic level have no significant impact on it. This paper, aiming at increasing water information disclosure quality, presents suggestions on establishing water information disclosure system, optimizing internal management and financial status and intensifying external supervision.
Ecological compensation is a vital mechanism in balancing regional economy and eco\|environmental protection. How to determine compensation standard and how to distribute compensation fund is a hard point. This paper uses eco\|system servicing value, GIS and remote sensing to analyze the changes in land use types and eco-system servicing values of Yangzhou in 2010, 2015 and 2018, which is applied to determine the upper limit of ecological compensation of water receiving area. ECPS is adopted to distribute the compensation fund. Yangzhou's land use structure has changed a lot during 2010 to 2018, with eco-system servicing value dropping to RMB 46 799 million from 55 359 million, 90.38% from water use eco\|system. Water receiving areas shall pay 2 091 million compensation, but the upper payment limit is 1 359 million, indicating an adjusted value by secondary water servicing at 80.02%, core compensation. Compensation funds are to be distributed to Gaoyou (1 013 million), Baoying (508 million), Hanjiang (281 million), Jiangdu (179 million), Yizheng (93 million) and Guangling (17 million) in an decreasing order. This paper presents suggestions on improving water source ecological compensation mechanism from determining compensation targets, setting up supervision and forming multiple compensation.
To protect the fairness of trade pricing of water discharging rights and to promote effective execution of water discharging right trade, this paper establishes an asymmetric information barging model based on fairness-preferred trade pricing of water discharging rights, which adopts reverse induction to solve three-staged barging gambling balance. Matlab R2014a is used to analyze the impacts of parameters on premier pricing and gambling effect. The higher acceptable lowest compensation price by seller is or highest compensation price by buyer is, the higher premier price is. If the highest compensation price by seller equals to the lowest acceptable compensation price by buyer in increment, the increased asking premier price by the former is larger than the latter. Fairness preference and discounting factor have little direction impacts on premier pricing at different gambling stages. The lower the lowest compensation price accepted by seller is or the higher the highest compensation price paid by buyer is, meaning a larger barging range, the higher the gambling effect will be made by both sides. The larger the barging discounting factor by both is, the larger gambling effect will be acquired by both. As discounting factor rises, if fairness preference maintained at a certain level, the buyer's whole gambling effect level is lower that the seller even if buyer asks price first and both maintain an equal earning increment.